Financial history of the De Beers retail jewellery venture, compiled from the audited statutory accounts filed at Companies House for each year since incorporation. Launched in 2001 as a 50/50 joint venture between De Beers and LVMH, the company opened its Old Bond Street flagship in 2002, expanded to a peak of 45 stores, passed through the LVMH exit (2017) and full De Beers plc ownership (2020), and by 2024 carried $171.8m of net liabilities after cumulative losses of roughly $1.1 billion. All figures in US dollars as reported.
Revenue took five years to become meaningful, plateaued around $120–180m for a decade, spiked to a record $221.9m in 2018 on exceptional Asian wholesale, and collapsed to $69.0m by 2024 — the lowest since 2009.
The company recorded a loss in 23 of its 24 years. The single profitable year — 2016, a $2.0m net profit — was driven by a one-off $15.6m key-money receipt from surrendering the Fifth Avenue lease, not by trading. The 2023–24 losses are dominated by impairments of amounts owed by overseas subsidiaries in the company-only accounts.
Capital expenditure tracked the store roll-out: heavy fit-out spend in 2005 (US flagships) and 2008 (network doubling plus $21.9m of key money for Place Vendôme), thin maintenance spend after the 2014 retrenchment, then a jump in 2024 as the new Paris flagship lease came onto the balance sheet as a right-of-use asset.
From one Bond Street store in 2002 to 43 outlets (including franchises) by 2008, a peak of 45 in 2013, then a pruning back to the mid-30s after the 2013–14 network review. The post-2021 rebound is driven almost entirely by Asia, which held 28 of the 42 doors by 2024.
The venture never funded itself. Shareholders recapitalised it almost every year — issued share capital climbed from $35m at launch to $890.8m after the $300m emergency injection of May 2023, broadly keeping pace with cumulative losses. By 2024 the company also owed $397m to Anglo American Capital under its group facility.
Every figure below is taken from the audited accounts for the year shown (US$ millions unless stated). The 2016 row is the only profitable year and is highlighted.
Basis of preparation — read before quoting. 2001–2002: company-only accounts (UK GAAP, whole US$). 2003–2016: consolidated group accounts (UK GAAP to 2005, IFRS from 2006). 2017–2024: company-only accounts — subsidiaries in Japan, the US, Hong Kong, Macau and China are no longer consolidated, so figures either side of 2016/17 are not directly comparable, and the very large 2019, 2023 and 2024 losses include impairments of intercompany balances ($53.8m, $181.3m and $58.4m respectively) that would largely eliminate on consolidation.
Restatements. 2006 was restated in the 2007 accounts (operating loss $20.3m → $25.0m; net loss $14.2m → $18.9m). 2022 was restated in the 2023 accounts under IAS 8 (revenue $164.6m → $159.2m; net loss $32.9m → $24.8m; operating result restated to a $7.9m profit) for consignment-stock revenue recognition and other errors. The charts show figures as originally reported.
Other notes. 2001 was a 13-month first period with no trading; its $26.2m "capex" was almost entirely $25.8m of diamonds bought from De Beers group companies and later reclassified to inventory. Store counts for 2002–2005 are from narrative disclosures and are approximate; from 2008 counts include franchised outlets. Employee numbers from 2017 are company-only. 2018 revenue includes exceptional Asian wholesale ($149.4m Asia); 2020 and 2021 include single exceptional sales of ~$98m and ~$61m. Going-concern emphases/material uncertainties were reported in 2008, 2009, 2023 and 2024.
Source: audited annual accounts of De Beers LV Ltd / De Beers Diamond Jewellers Ltd / De Beers Jewellers Ltd, FY2001–FY2024, Companies House filings.